DePaul Journal of Art, Technology
& Intellectual Property Law
Volume 23
Issue 1 Fall 2012

Article 5

Black and White: A Path Toward Clarity for Copyright Law and
Gray Market Goods
Robert A. Paul

Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip

Recommended Citation
Robert A. Paul, Black and White: A Path Toward Clarity for Copyright Law and Gray Market Goods, 23
DePaul J. Art, Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 155 (2012)
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol23/iss1/5

This Seminar Articles is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Digital
Commons@DePaul. It has been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property
Law by an authorized editor of Digital Commons@DePaul. For more information, please contact
digitalservices@depaul.edu.

Paul: Black and White: A Path Toward Clarity for Copyright Law and Gray

BLACK AND WHITE:
A PATH TOWARD CLARITY FOR COPYRIGHT

LAW AND GRAY MARKET GOODS
I. INTRODUCTION

United States copyright holders possess a broad array of
exclusive rights, including the ability to make of copies of their
work, control the distribution of those copies, and to block the
importation of unauthorized copies of their work.' However,
certain rights bestowed upon copyright holders are extinguished
once an authorized copy of their work has been sold.2 This
principle, known as the "first sale doctrine," serves to balance the
ability of copyright holders to seek profit from their creative
efforts against the public's ability to freely trade in goods.
Determining the scope of the first sale doctrine is key to
understanding whether copyright law can be used to control socalled gray market goods. The central issue is whether the first
sale doctrine applies to copyrighted goods manufactured abroad.
If the first sale doctrine applies to such goods, then copyright
holders are unable to control the distribution and importation of
their works once they are subject to a lawful sale.4 On the other
hand, if the first sale doctrine does not apply to these foreignmanufactured goods, then any unauthorized importation or
distribution may be copyright infringement, even if the goods have
The answer to this question
changed hands several times.'
1. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§, 106, 602 (2006).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006) ("[T]he owner of a particular copy or
phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such
owner, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority
of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that
copy or phonorecord.").
3. Sebastian International, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F.2d
1093, 1095 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)).
4. Id. at 1097.
5. Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 990 (9th Cir.
2008), aff'd by an equally divided court, 131 S.Ct. 565 (2010); John Wiley &
Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210, 217 (2d Cir. 2011).
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involves core policy judgments regarding the purpose of the
Copyright Act and has broad economic implications affecting
domestic companies, consumers, and the American workforce.
In general, gray market goods are goods that are originally
intended for sale in one market, but end up being sold in a
different market.6 These goods are created when third parties, not
the copyright holder's authorized distributor, purchase domestic or
foreign-manufactured goods abroad and import them into the
Unites States for resale.' Gray market goods become problematic
for United States copyright holders when they are imported and
compete with the copyright holder's products that are sold
domestically at higher prices.
While distressing to holders of valuable copyrights, such as
large media companies, imported goods play a significant role in
the United States economy. Those who engage in the trade of
potential gray market goods include individual Americans, small
businesses, and Internet marketplaces for goods, such as eBay.
Additionally, many domestic consumers benefit from the trade of
gray market goods, namely by gaining access to goods and
creative content that may not otherwise be obtainable at lower
prices.
In an attempt to control and suppress the gray market, Unites
States companies previously turned to trademark and contract law,
with unsatisfactory results.9 Frustrated, the focus turned toward

6. Donna K. Hintz, Battling Gray Market Goods With Copyright Law, 57
L. REv. 1187, 1188 (1994). 1 use the term "gray market" rather than its
equivalent, "parallel market," because "gray market" appears to have become
the term of choice in academic commentary. It should be noted that use of the
term "gray market" has been criticized by supporters of the practice, who
suggest that the term creates an unjustified atmosphere of borderline legality.
Jamie S. Gorelick & Rory K. Little, The Casefor ParallelImportation, 11 N.C.
ALB.

J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 205, 207 n.5 (1986).

7. Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. C & C Beauty Sales, Inc., 832 F. Supp 1378,
1382 n.l (C.D. Cal 1983).
8. Harry Rubin, Destined to Remain Grey: The Eternal Recurrence of
ParallelImports, 26 INT'L LAW. 597, 597, 610-11 (1992).
9. See generally Christopher A. Mohr, Gray Market Goods and Copyright
Law: An End Run Around K Mart v. Cartier, 45 CATH. U. L. REv. 561 (1996)
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copyright law and the uncertain scope of the first sale doctrine as a
mechanism to control the unwanted of importation and sale of
goods.'o
In response, courts have provided conflicting guidance. The
first issue addressed by courts-that of copyrighted goods
manufactured domestically, exported, and then re-imported-was
discussed by the Third Circuit in Sebastian International,Inc. v.
Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd.," and by the Supreme Court in
Quality King Distributors,Inc. v. L'anza Research International,
Inc.12 In Sebastian, the Third Circuit issued a broad holding,
stating that the first sale doctrine applies in all sales not limited by
contract, no matter where the sales take place or where the goods
are manufactured.13 This broad holding gives copyright holders
little recourse in controlling unwanted importation or distribution
of their goods. Ten years later, the Supreme Court in Quality King
issued a more narrow ruling, stating that the first sale doctrine
applies to the importation right, but limited its holding to
domestically-manufactured goods.1
This partially affirmed
Sebastian, but the question regarding foreign-manufactured goods
remained open outside the Third Circuit.
The issue of copyrighted goods manufactured domestically,
exported, and then re-imported was addressed by the Ninth Circuit
in Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp." and most recently by
6
In
the Second Circuit in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng.1
Omega, the Ninth Circuit held that the first sale doctrine did not
apply to foreign manufactured goods, but made an exception once
copyrighted works have been imported and sold domestically with
This holding gave
the permission of the copyright holder."
copyright owners some recourse in limiting the importation of gray
(regarding the shortcomings and judicial failures of companies attempting to
control gray market goods using trademark and contract law).
10. Id. See also Hintz, supra note 5, at 1188.
11. Sebastian,845 F.2d at 1094.
12. Quality King, 523 U.S. at 138.
13. Sebastian, 845 F.2d at 1099.
14. Quality King, 523 U.S. at 138.
15. Omega, 541 F.3d at 987.
16. Wiley, 654 F.3d at 212.
17. Omega, 541 F.3d at 990.
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market goods that have been manufactured abroad, as such
unauthorized actions would be infringement of the Copyright Act.
The Second Circuit's Wiley decision also found that the first sale
doctrine does not apply to foreign-manufactured goods, but did not
include Omega's exception for goods that had been imported and
sold domestically with the copyright owner's permission." This
holding would give copyright holders broad control of the
importation and distribution of their works. Under Wiley, any
unauthorized importation or sale of a copy manufactured abroad
without the consent of the copyright holder would be considered
an infringement of the Copyright Act; this would effectively give
copyright holders perpetual control over copies of their work that
were manufactured abroad. As of this writing, the Supreme Court
granted the defendant-appellant's petition for certiorari in Wiley
and oral arguments were heard on October 29, 2012, presenting an
opportunity for the issue to be definitively decided.
Disarray among the courts is attributable to the ambiguous
meaning of the Copyright Act, particularly the phase "lawfully
made under this title" as it appears in § 109(a). While courts have
been consistent in holding that the importation right of § 602(a) is
subject to § 109(a), division occurs in interpreting whether §
109(a)'s phrase "lawfully made under this title" means "made in
the United States with the copyright owner's consent" or merely
"made with the copyright owner's consent," regardless of place of
manufacture. The Sebastian and Quality King opinions discussed
the phrase, but did not clearly define its meaning. 9 However,
Omega and Wiley both defined the phrase to mean "made in the
United States with the permission of the copyright holder."2 0
18. Wiley, 654 F.3d at 221.
19. See Sebastian, 845 F.2d at 1098 n.1 ("We confess some uneasiness with
this construction of 'lawfully made' because it does not fit comfortably within
the scheme of the Copyright Act. When Congress considered the place of
manufacture to be important, as it did in the manufacturing requirement of
section 601(a), the statutory language clearly expresses that concern."). In dicta,
the Quality King Court stated "presumably only those made by the publisher of
the U.S. edition would be 'lawfully made under this title' within the meaning of
§ 109(a)." Quality King, 523 U.S. at 148.
20. Omega, 541 F.3d at 988 ("In short, copies covered by the phrase
"lawfully made under [Title 17]" in § 109(a) are not simply those which are
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Part II will trace the evolution of the first sale doctrine and how
it has been interpreted in conjunction with the importation right in
the Sebastian, Quality King, Omega and Wiley decisions. Part III
will first examine the text of the Copyright Act and its legislative
history, demonstrating that both are unclear in defining the
meaning and interaction between § 109(a) and § 602(a). Second,
with no clear directive to be found in the text or its legislative
history, Part III will present the policy arguments in favor of
reading the phrase "lawfully made under this title" to mean "made
with the consent of the copyright holder" without any geographic
qualifications. Finally, Part IV will present two options for
resolving the current uncertainty to comport with the goals of the
Copyright Act and broader United States economic policy. First,
the Supreme Court should find in favor of the petitioners in Wiley
and hold that the first sale doctrine applies to all copyrighted goods
manufactured with the consent of the copyright holder, regardless
of place of manufacture. Alternatively, if the Supreme Court
affirms the Wiley court's decision, Congress should promptly
amend the Copyright Act to clearly state that the importation right
is subject to the first sale doctrine, regardless of place of
manufacture.
II. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL BACKGROUND

A. Exclusive Rights Under the CopyrightAct
Among the rights enjoyed by copyright holders is the exclusive
right to make and distribute copies of their work. This right is
codified in the Copyright Act in § 106(3) which reads "[s]ubject to
sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title
has the exclusive

rights . . . to distribute copies . . . of the

copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of

lawfully made by the owner of a U.S. copyright. Something more is required.
To us, that "something" is the making of the copies within the United States,
where the Copyright Act applies."); Wiley, 654 F.3d at 222 ("In sum, we hold
that the phrase 'lawfully made under this Title' in § 109(a) refers specifically
and exclusively to copies that are made in territories in which the Copyright Act
is law, and not to foreign-manufactured works.").
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ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending."2 1 A subpart of this
broader right to control the distribution of copies is the copyright
holder's right to limit the importation of copies acquired outside of
the United States. This right, found in § 602(a) is stated as:
[i]mportation into the United States, without
authority of the owner of the copyright under this
title, of copies . .. of a work that have been

acquired outside the United States is an
infringement of the exclusive right to distribute
copies ... under section 106, actionable under
section 501.22
Note that violation of this right of importation is described as an
infringement of the broader right to distribute, found in § 106.
Section 106, while offering control over the distribution of works,
is limited "subject to sections 107 through 122." Included among
those sections is § 109, the first sale doctrine.
B. Limitations on the Right ofDistribution- The FirstSale
Doctrine
As stated, the ability of copyright holders to control the
distribution of their works is limited by the first sale doctrine. The
first sale doctrine allows the purchaser of a legally made copy to
sell, lease, or transfer ownership of the copy without the
permission of the copyright holder.
The first sale doctrine is rooted in long-held common law rules
Those
regarding restraints on the alienation of property. 23
concerns shaped the reasoning of early judge-made rules in patent
law cases of the mid-nineteenth century.24

21. 17 U.S.C § 106(3) (2006).
22. 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (2006).
23. See generally JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF
PROPERTY (2d ed. 1895).
24. Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The
First Sale Doctrine in Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 487, 494

(2011). The Supreme Court's first statement regarding the first sale doctrine
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In 1908, the Supreme Court applied the first sale doctrine to
copyright law in Bobbs-Merrill v. Strauss.2 5 In Bobbs-Merrill, the
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a copyright owner
could control the original and resale price of copies of the
protected work. The work in question was the novel The
Castaway, by Hallie Ermine Rives. The book's legend contained
the following notice: "The price of this book at retail is one dollar
net. No dealer is licensed to sell it at less price, and a sale at less
price will be treated as an infringement of the copyright."26
In finding for the resellers of the works, the Supreme Court
noted that a purpose of the Copyright Act was to give authors the
right to sell multiple copies of the works. Seizing on the statutory
use of the word "vend,"27 the Court found that although rights

was found in Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539 (1853). In Bloomer, the Court
succinctly stated the basic principle of the first sale doctrine, "when the machine
passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the
[patent] monopoly." Id. at 549. The strongest early statement of the first sale
doctrine was found in Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453 (1873). In Adams, the Court
considered whether a manufacturer could limit the territory in which its products
were resold. Id. at 457 (Bradley, J., dissenting). In finding against the
manufacturer, the Court stated:
in the essential nature of things, when the patentee, or the
person having his rights, sells a machine or instrument whose
sole value is in its use, he receives the consideration for its use
and he parts with the right to restrict that use. The article, in
the language of the court, passes without the limit of the
monopoly. That is to say, the patentee or his assignee having
in the sale received all the royalty or consideration which he
claims for the use of his invention in that particular machine
or instrument, it is open to the use of the purchaser without
further restriction on account of the monopoly of the
patentees.
Id. at 456 (majority opinion).
25. Bobbs-Merrill,210 U.S. at 350-51.
26. Id. at 341.
27. Id. at 347-48 (citing Copyright Act of 1891, § 4952, 26 Stat. 1106, 1107
(stating that copyright owners had "the sole liberty of printing, reprinting,
publishing, completing, copying, executing, finishing and vending" their
copyrighted works. In subsequent versions of the Act, the right to "vend" was
replaced with the right to "distribute.")).
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holders had the exclusive right to sell original copies of the work,
the right was exhausted once the first sale was made.28
The exhaustion of the right of control after the first sale has been
made was codified the following year in the 1909 Copyright Act.
The 1909 Act stated "nothing in this Act shall be deemed to forbid,
prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work
the possession of which has been lawfully obtained."2
In the 1976 Copyright Act, the first sale doctrine was codified in
§ 109(a).3 0 Section 109(a) reads:
[n]otwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3),
the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord
lawfully made under this title, or any person
authorized by such owner, or any person authorized
by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of
the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of
that copy or phonorecord."'
Congress' intent to codify the principles established by BobbsMerrill was made clear by the legislative reports accompanying
the 1976 Act: "[s]ection 109(a) restates and confirms the principle
that, where the copyright owner has transferred ownership of a
particular copy or phonorecord of a work, the person to whom the
copy or phonorecord is transferred is entitled to dispose of it by
sale, rental, or any other means."32
Congress also explicitly stated that while the Copyright Act did
not restrict the resale of copyrighted works, copyright holders
retained the ability to restrict the resale of goods through contract:
[t]his does not mean that conditions on future
dispositions of copies or phonorecords, imposed by

28. Id. at 350-51.
29. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 41, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084
(repealed 1976).
30. 17 U.S.C. §109(a) (2006).
31. Id. (emphasis added).
32. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 79 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5693.
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a contract between their buyer and seller, would
unenforceable between the parties as a breach
contract, but it does mean that they could not
enforced by an action for infringement
copyright.

be
of
be
of

The tension between the first sale doctrine and the distribution
and importation rights is evident in the text of these sections.
Under the 1976 Act, unauthorized importation in violation of §
602(a) is an infringement of the distribution right of §106, while §
106 is explicitly limited by the first sale doctrine of § 109(a).
However, the phrase "lawfully made under this title" in § 109(a) is
not defined, making the extent of the first sale doctrine unclear.
This open question and tension among the sections has been
explored by the following four appellate decisions.
C. JudicialInterpretationsof the FirstSale Doctrine'sLimitations
Appellate courts have had few opportunities to review the
interaction between the first sale doctrine of § 109(a) and the
importation right found in § 602(a). The issue of copyrighted
goods manufactured domestically, exported, and re-imported was
addressed by the Third Circuit in Sebastian International,Inc. v.
Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd.3 4 and by the Supreme Court in
Quality King Distributors,Inc. v. L'anza Research International,
Inc.35 Two other circuit courts have addressed the issue of the
importation of foreign-manufactured copyrighted goods which
were subsequently imported: the Ninth Circuit in Omega S.A. v.
Costco Wholesale Corp., 6 and, most recently, the Second Circuit
in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng.3

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

S. REP. No. 94-473, at 71-72 (1975).
Sebastian,845 F.2d at 1094.
QualityKing, 523 U.S.at 138.
Omega, 541 F.3d at 983.
Wiley, 654 F.3d at 212.
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1. The Relationship between § 109(a) and§ 602 (a)(1) When the
Copies are Legally ManufacturedDomestically,Legally
PurchasedAbroad, andRe-Imported
a. Sebastian International, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts
Faced with the scenario of copyrighted works manufactured in
the United States, shipped abroad, resold, and then imported, the
Third Circuit held in Sebastian International,Inc. v. Consumer
Contacts (PTY) Ltd. that the first sale doctrine applies in all sales
not limited by contract, no matter where the sales take place or
where the goods are manufactured." The copyrighted goods at
issue in Sebastian were labels affixed to hair care products that
were manufactured in the United States, exported and sold abroad,
and then re-imported. 9
In its analysis, the court began by stating "[a]t first glance,
section 602(a)-the importation clause-appears to clash with the
first sale doctrine." 40
The court recognized that the
interrelationship between § 602(a) and § 109(a) could be read two
different ways, but that neither was conclusively supported by the
statutory language or legislative history. 4 ' First, § 602 could be
read to give copyright holders a new right, separate from the
distribution right found in § 106(3), which would free copyright
owners from the limitations of the first sale doctrine of § 109(a).42
Conversely, § 602(a) could be read as merely an example of the
rights still subject to the first sale doctrine.43 The court recognized
that this reading would not give copyright owners the ability to
38. Sebastian,845 F.2d at 1099.
39. Id. at 1094.
40. Id. at 1097.
41. Id.
42. Id. ("The first, and most sweeping, construction declares that in addition
to the distribution rights conferred by section 106(3), section 602(a) grants
copyright owners yet another direct right-one that frees them from the first
sale right of section 109(a) . . . .").
43. Id. ("The second interpretation reconciles section 106(3) and 602(a) by
reasoning that the importation prohibition does not enlarge the distribution
rights, but serves as only an example of those rights subject still to the first sale
doctrine.").
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block the unwanted importation of copies sold in violation of
foreign distribution agreements, but such unwanted imports are not
explicitly infringement under the Act."
To reconcile the competing views and reach its conclusion, the
court looked to the text and underlying policies of the Copyright
Act. First, the court recognized that the plaintiff received an
adequate reward under its monopoly granted by the Copyright Act
because there was a lawful sale and nothing in §602(a) suggests
that a copyright owner should receive more than its just reward for
selling copies abroad.45 Second, the court determined that the
importation restrictions of § 602(a) do not create a new right,
because the text specifically states that the violation of that section
is an infringement of the distribution right of § 106(3).46 Further,
because § 106(3) is specifically limited by the first sale doctrine of
§ 109(a), "it necessarily follows that once transfer of ownership
has cancelled the distribution right to a copy, the right does not
survive as to be infringed by importation."47
In its conclusion, the court addressed the controversy regarding
gray market goods, pointing out that although Sebastian was a
copyright law case, the issues regarding gray market goods "really
are dominant."4 8 The court noted that manufacturers, having failed
in their attempts to control gray market goods through contract
law, were attempting to use copyright law to meet those ends,
using labels affixed to products to control the sales of those
products.49 It admonished such behavior, stating, "[w]e think the
controversy over 'gray market' goods . ..

should be resolved

44. Sebastian,845 F.2d at 1097.
45. Id. at 1098-99. Earlier in its opinion, the court recognized the economic
rationale behind the first sale doctrine, stating, "the ultimate question under the
'first sale' doctrine is whether or not there has been a disposition of the
copyrighted article that it may fairly be said that the copyright proprietor has
received his reward for its use." Id. at 1096-97 (quoting Burke & Van Heusen,
Inc. v. Arrow Drug, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 881, 884 (E.D. Pa. 1964)).
46. Id. at 1099.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. (citing Johnson & Johnson Products v. DAL Int'l Trading Co., 798
F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1986)).
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directly on its merits by Congress, not by judicial extension of the
Copyright Act's limited monopoly."o
b. Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'anza Research
International, Inc.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of "whether the 'first
sale' doctrine endorsed in § 109(a) is applicable to imported
copies" in Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'anza Research
International,Inc."' Addressing the issue of copies manufactured
domestically, exported and then re-imported, a unanimous Court
found that the first sale doctrine of § 109(a), operating together
with the distribution right of § 106(3), limits the scope of the
However, the
importation restrictions found in § 602(a).52
Supreme Court did not issue the broad ruling issued by the Third
Circuit in Sebastian. Instead, as Justice Ginsberg stressed in a
concurring opinion, "we do not today resolve cases in which the
allegedly infringing imports were manufactured abroad."53
In its analysis, the Court did not struggle with perceived
contradictions in the statute, as noted by Sebastian and later courts.
The Court found that the language of the statute unequivocally
supported the finding that the importation right in § 602(a) was
limited by §109(a).54 To reach this conclusion, the Court found it
significant that § 602(a) "does not categorically prohibit the
unauthorized importation of copyrighted materials."" Instead, "it
is an infringement of the exclusive right to distribute under
'section 106."'56 Therefore, because § 106 is limited by the first
sale doctrine in §109(a), § 602(a) is subject to the limitations of the
first sale doctrine.

50. Sebastian,845 F.2d at 1099.
51. Quality King, 523 U.S. at 138.
52. Id. at 145.
53. Id. at 154 (Ginsberg, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 144.
55. Id.
56. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C.§ 602(a) (2006)).
57. Quality King, 523 U.S. at 144. Referring to the Court's earliest first sale
doctrine case regarding copyright law, the Court stated, "[1]ike the exclusive
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Although the Court left open the question of the first sale
doctrine's application to foreign manufactured goods, it did ponder
the issue in dicta. Considering a hypothetical situation in which a
British manufacturer imports copies of books in violation of a
licensing agreement, the Court speculated, "presumably only those
made by the publisher of the U.S. edition would be 'lawfully made
under this title."'I' The opinion noted, "although both the first sale
doctrine embodied in § 109(a) and the exceptions in § 602(a) may
be applicable in some situations, the former does not subsume the
latter; those provisions retain significant independent meaning.""
As this passage appears in a unanimous opinion, it has been read
as a definitive statement of the Court's opinion that the first sale
doctrine does not apply to foreign manufactured copies."o
However, when the question of whether the first sale doctrine
applies to foreign manufactured copies reached the Court later in
Omega, the Court was split 4-4."6

Because the Court issued a narrow opinion in Quality King
focused only on domestically manufactured copies, a definitive

right to "vend" that was construed in Bobbs-Merrill, the exclusive right to
distribute is a limited right." Id.
58. Id. at 148. The court considered the following hypothetical situation in
dicta:
[i]f the author of [a] work gave the exclusive U.S. distribution
rights-enforceable under the Act-to the publisher of the
U.S. edition and the exclusive British distribution rights to the
publisher of the British edition,.. . presumably only those
made by the publisher of the U.S. edition would be 'lawfully
made under this title' within the meaning of § 109(a). The
first sale doctrine would not provide the publisher of the
British edition who decided to sell in the American market
with a defense to an action under § 602(a) (or, for that matter,
to an action under § 106(3), if there was a distribution of the
copies).
Id.
59. Id. at 148-49.
60. In Wiley, the Second Circuit supported its holding that the first sale
doctrine does not apply to foreign manufactured copies by referring to the
Quality King dicta and observed that this construction is what the Supreme
Court "appear[s] to have had in mind." Wiley, 654 F.3d at 221.
61. Omega, 131 S. Ct. at 565.

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

13

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 5

168

DEPAULJ ART, TECH. &IPLAW [Vol. XXIII:155

answer to the question regarding foreign manufactured goods
remained open. The Court's narrow holding also had the effect of
leaving the broad holding of Sebastian-thatthe first sale doctrine
applies regardless of place of manufacture-intact. The specific
question of whether the first sale doctrine applies to foreign
manufactured copies was addressed directly in the following two
cases.
2. The Relationshipbetween § 109(a) and§ 602(a)(1) When the
Copies are Legally ManufacturedAbroad, Legally Purchased
Abroad, and Imported.
a. Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp.
In a case in which the copies at issue were manufactured abroad
before being imported, the Ninth Circuit held in Omega S.A. v.
Costco Wholesale Corp. that the first sale doctrine only applied to
goods manufactured in the United States.6 2 Relying on earlier
Ninth Circuit precedent stating that § 109(a) was limited to copies
"legally made ... in the United States,"" the court found that the
first sale doctrine was not a defense to an infringement action for
Therefore, the unauthorized
importation under § 602(a).64
importation of foreign manufactured goods bearing copyrighted
material is infringement of the Copyright Act, even if the goods
have changed hands multiple times. However, the court made an
exception for goods manufactured abroad and subsequently sold
lawfully within the United States. In those instances, the first
sale doctrine would apply and the copyright holder could no longer
control its distribution."6
In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit declined to follow the
reasoning of Quality King. Instead, noting that because the
copyrighted goods in Omega were manufactured abroad, Quality

62. Omega, 541 F.3d at 988.
63. BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F.2d 318, 319 (9th Cir. 1991). See also
Denbicare U.S.A. Inc. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 84 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 1996).
64. Omega, 541 F.3d at 990.
65. Id. at 988-89.
6 6. Id.
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King did not directly overrule its previous decisions that found §
109 (a)'s phrase "lawfully made under this title" to mean "legally
made . . . in the United States."6 ' The court also reaffirmed its
earlier ruling that the first sale doctrine would be a valid defense to
copyright infringement once there was a lawful sale within the
United States.68
To bolster its reasoning, the Ninth Circuit relied on the
extraterritoriality doctrine to limit the scope of § 109(a) to
copyrighted goods manufactured in the United States. The court
stated the presumption against extraterritoriality is that "a U.S.
statute appl[ies] only to conduct occurring within, or having effect
within, the territory of the United States, unless the contrary is
clearly indicated by the statute."6 ' Applying a "more robust"
version of this presumption to the Copyright Act, the Court held
that "the Act presumptively does not apply to conduct that occurs
abroad even when that conduct produces harmful effects within the
United States."70

67. Id. at 987. In BMG Music, the Ninth Circuit found that "lawfully made
under this title" meant "legally made ...

in the United States."

BMG Music,

952 F.2d at 319. The court argued that to find otherwise would "render § 602
meaningless as a tool against the unauthorized importation of nonpiratical
copies because importation is almost always preceded by at least one lawful
foreign sale that will have exhausted the distribution right which § 602(a) is
premised." Id. at 319-20. This interpretation has been reaffirmed in the Ninth
Circuit. Parfums Givenchy, 38 F.3d at 482; Denbicare,84 F.3d at 1149.
68. Omega, 541 F.3d at 989-990. After BMG Music, the court faced
criticism suggesting that because copyrighted goods manufactured abroad
would not be subject to the first sale doctrine, U.S. manufacturers would move
production abroad in order to gain perpetual control over their copies. Parfums
Givenchy, 38 F.3d at 482 n.8. In response, the court carved out an exception
that "§ 109(a) can apply to copies not made in the United States so long as an
authorized first sale occurs here." Omega, 541 F.3d at 985.
69. Omega, 541 F.3d at 987-88 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 38 (1965) (internal
quotations omitted)).

70. Id. at 988. The court did not define or explain what it intended by the
phrase "more robust," nor did it recognize the portions of the Copyright Act that
clearly are concerned with extraterritorial conduct. See infra, Part III.A.4.
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On appeal, an equally divided Supreme Court affirmed Omega
without comment in a per curiam opinion." Therefore, the Omega
opinion created a circuit split with the Third Circuit's holding in
Sebastian that the first sale doctrine is applicable regardless of the
place of manufacture. A third irreconcilable holding followed in
Wiley.
b. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng
The Second Circuit's recent decision in John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
v. Kirtsaeng, also dealing with copies manufactured and sold
legally abroad, found a more limited application of the first sale
doctrine than the Ninth Circuit in Omega.72 The Wiley court held
that § 109(a)'s phrase "lawfully made under this title" referred
only to copies made in the United States." The court noted, but
refused to endorse, the Ninth Circuit's Omega exception for copies
subject to a lawful sale within the United States, due to lack of
statutory support within the Copyright Act.74 Therefore, under
Wiley, any unauthorized importation or distribution of copyrighted
material manufactured outside the United States would constitute
an infringement of the Copyright Act, regardless of how many
times the copy was sold, even within the United States.
Analyzing the Act, the court found no clear meaning of the
phrase "lawfully made under this title" in § 109(a)." Similar to the
Sebastian court, the court determined that, under a logical

71. Omega, 131 S.Ct. at 565. In cases when the Supreme Court is evenly
split, the lower court's ruling is upheld, but the decision creates no nationwide
precedent. See Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107, 110 (1869) ("[N]o
affirmative action can be had in a cause where the judges are equally divided in
opinion as to the judgment to be rendered or order to be made.").
72. Wiley, 654 F.3d at 224. The copyrighted goods at issue in Wiley were
textbooks manufactured in the Philippines and intended only for foreign
distribution. Id. at 213. The defendant's family and friends purchased the
books overseas and shipped the books to Kirtsaeng in the United States. Id.
Kirtsaeng then resold the books online, reimbursed his friends and family for the
costs of the books and shipping, and retained the profits for himself. Id.
73. Id. at 222.
74. Id. at 221.
75. Id. at 218-20.
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interpretation, the phrase could mean either copies made only in
the United States, or could encompass all copies made with the
authorization of the copyright holder, regardless of place of
Additionally, the court failed to find the
manufacture.76
extraterritoriality argument determinative, noting that "it is at least
arguable that Congress intended ['lawfully made under this title']
to apply to works manufactured outside of the United States."77
To resolve the "utterly ambiguous text," the court determined
that the application of the first sale doctrine was limited to copies
made domestically, reasoning that to hold otherwise would vitiate
the meaning of the importation right "in the vast majority of
cases."78 In support if its holding, the court observed that its
limited view of the first sale doctrine is what the Supreme Court
"appear[s] to have had in mind" in its Quality King dicta,
discussed above. 9
The dissenting opinion in Wiley reached the conclusion that "the
first sale defense should apply to a copy of a work that enjoys
United States copyright protection wherever manufactured.""o The
dissent first demonstrates that courts have been divided over the
meaning of the phrase "lawfully made under this title."" To
resolve this conflict, the dissent notes that "[t]he statutory text does
not refer to a place of manufacture" and when place of

76. Id. at 220.
77. Id. The court cites § 1006(a)(1)(A) of the Audio Home Recording Act
that provides for royalty payments to be made to "any interested copyright party
whose musical work or sound recording has been embodied in a digital musical
recording or an analog musical recording lawfully made under this tile that has
been distributed. . . ." 17 U.S.C. § 1006(a)(1)(A) (2006).
78. Wiley, 654 F.3d at 220-21.
79. Id. at 221. For the hypothetical situation referred to by the court, see
supra note 57 and accompanying text.
80. Id. at 225 (Murtha, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 226 (citing CBS, Inc. v. Scorpio Music Distrib., Inc., 569 F. Supp.
47, 49 (E.D. Pa. 1983), affd without opinion, 738 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1984);
Omega, 541 F.3d at 988-89). Conversely, Sebastian "confess[ed] some
uneasiness with this construction" and suggested "lawfully made under this
title" refers not to the place a copy is manufactured, but to the lawfulness of its
manufacture as a function of U.S. copyright law. Sebastian, 847 F.2d at 1098
n. 1.
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manufacture is important, it has been included in the text.8 2
Additionally, the first sale doctrine and its associated policies
against restraints on trade have historically not had a geographic
limitation." Therefore, "nothing in ... the history, purposes, or
policies in the first sale doctrine limit it to copies of a work
manufactured in the United States."84 Finally, the dissent points
out that the issue in this case was not before the Supreme Court
when it issued its dicta in Quality King." Rather, when the issue
at hand was squarely before it in Omega, the Court was equally
divided."
The Defendant-Appellant filed a petition for writ of certiorari in
the Supreme Court on December 7 2011. (Docket No. 11-697).
The writ of certiorari was granted on April 16, 2012 and oral
arguments were heard on October 29, 2012.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Statutory Analysis
Looking to the plain meaning of the Copyright Act, the statute
as a whole, and its legislative history, there is a strong case for
82. Wiley, 654 F.3d at 226 (Murtha, J., dissenting). Specifically, the socalled "manufacturing requirement" provides: "[p]rior to July 1, 1986, and
except as provided by subsection (b), the importation into or public distribution
in the United States of copies of a work consisting preponderantly on
nondramatic literary material that is in the English language and is protected
under this title is prohibited unless the portions consisting of such material have
been manufactured in the United States or Canada." Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. §
601(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis in original) (repealed 2010)).
83. Id. at 227-28. The dissent notes that the common law policies behind the
first sale doctrine expressed in Bobbs-Merril were not geographically limited.
Id. at 227 (citing Pearson Educ. v. Liu, 656 F. Supp. 2d 407, 413 (S.D.N.Y.
2009)). Further, the first sale doctrine codified in both the 1909 and 1947
Copyright Acts applied to "any copy of a copyrighted work the possession of
which has been lawfully obtained." Id. (quoting Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat.
1075, 1084 (1909), Pub.L. No. 80-281, 61 Stat. 652, 660 (1947) (emphasis
added)).
84. Id. at 228.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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interpreting the phrase "lawfully made under this title" to be
without geographic limitations. However, looking to the same
sources, the phrase may also be logically interpreted to mean,
"made in the United States with the authority of the copyright
Considering these competing interpretations, as
holder."
evidenced in the three different holdings in Sebastian, Omega, and
Wiley, the current state of the law is unclear and warrants review
by the Supreme Court, or in the alternative, a legislative remedy.
1. A Plain MeaningReading of the Statute is Ultimately
Inconclusive.
A recognized starting point for analyzing the meaning of terms
in a statute is the statute itself, or the plain meaning of the
language used." The phrase "lawfully made under this title" is not
defined within the Copyright Act itself. If the meaning of a phrase
is not defined by the statute, the Supreme Court "normally
construe[s] it in accord with its ordinary or natural meaning." As
discussed, when analyzing the plain meaning of the words
"lawfully made under this title," the Third, Ninth, and Second
Circuits have all reached divergent opinions.
In Sebastian, the Third Circuit read the phrase to mean that the
first sale doctrine will apply if the copy was made consistent with
the principles of the Act. This is perhaps the simplest and most
direct reading of the phrase: essentially, that the copy was lawfully
made if it was made with the permission of the copyright holder."
This was the same position taken by the government in Quality
King, where it argued "[t]he correct and more natural reading of
the phrase 'lawfully made under this title' refers simply to any
copy made with the authorization of the copyright owner as

87. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) ("It is elementary
that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the
language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain.. .the sole function of
the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.").
88. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993).
89. This is supported by looking to other sections of the Copyright Act. For
example, the copyright holder in 17 U.S.C. § 106 has the right "to authorize"
any of its exclusive rights. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
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required by Title 17, or otherwise authorized by specific
provisions of Title 17."o
Further, the plain meaning of the words "lawfully made under"
do not on their face mean "manufactured in the United States."
The phrases themselves have different inherent meanings. The
Third Circuit recognized this in Sebastian, noting that "[w]hen
Congress considered the place of manufacture to be important ...
the statutory language clearly expresses that concern."9' In fact, the
Copyright Act once used both the phrase "under this title" and
"manufactured in the United States."92 Finally, other statutes use
the phrase "manufactured in the United States" when that is the
intention rather than a vague self-referential phrase."
However, the phrase "lawfully made under this title" may also
be interpreted to mean "lawfully made in the United States."94 For
example, in Wiley the Second Circuit noted that the Supreme Court
has previously defined "under" to mean "subject to" and
"governed by."" The Wiley court also found that this plain
90. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, at
30 n.18, Quality King, 523 U.S. 135 (No. 96-1470), 1997 WL 588864 at *31.
91. Sebastian, 845 F.2d at 1098 n.l.
92. The now expired "manufacturing requirement" read: "the importation
into or public distribution in the United States of copies of a work consisting
preponderantly of non dramatic literary material that is in the English language
and is protected under this title is prohibited unless the portions of such material
have been manufactured in the United States or Canada." 17 U.S.C. § 601(a)
(2006) (repealed 2010) (emphasis added).
93. See 15 U.S.C. §1124 (2006) (banning the importation of goods that "bear
a name or mark calculated to induce the public to believe that the article is
manufactured in the United States," (emphasis added)); 19 U.S.C. § 1673(l)(2)
(2006) (penalizing a trading partner who "no longer prevents the suppression or
undercutting of domestic prices of merchandise manufactured in the United
States," (emphasis added)); 14 U.S.C. § 97(a)(1) (2006) ("[T]he Coast Guard
may not procure buoy chain that is not manufactured in the United States;"
(emphasis added)).
94. This was also the position taken by the United States in its amicus brief
before the Supreme Court in Omega. Brief for the United States as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondent, Omega, 131 S.Ct. 565 (2010) (No. 08-1423),
2010 WL 3512773 at *5.
95. Wiley, 654 F.3d at 219 n.31 (citing Ardestanti v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 135
(1991) (defining the meaning of the word "under" in the Equal Access to Justice
Act)). This was also the position taken by the United States in its amicus brief
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meaning interpretation of the statute was valid, but found that a
logical, contradictory reading could also be gleaned from the text.96
The court determined that because of these competing
interpretations, it must look to other policy considerations to
determine the meaning of the statute.9 7 Given this logical
interpretation and considering the policy implications, the overall
policy supports finding the first sale doctrine of § 109(a)
applicable to the importation right of § 602(a).
2. Looking at the Statute as a Whole is Similarly Inconclusive.
When the plain meaning of a term or phase is unclear, courts
may examine the uses of the same language elsewhere in the
statute for clarification." Following this analysis, other provisions
of the Copyright Act strongly suggest that "lawfully made under
this title" means goods manufactured with the consent of the
copyright owner and not constrained by geographic barriers.
Applying the Wiley court's reasoning that "lawfully made under
this title" is equivalent to "manufactured within the United States"
to other sections of the Act creates extreme, contradictory, or
nonsensical results. However, a valid argument does exist for
interpreting the phrase in accordance with the Wiley opinion.
One such seemingly extreme result would occur when applying
the Wiley court's interpretation of the phrase to the right to display
works. The exclusive right to display a copyrighted work
publically "is subject to the limitations found in §§ 107 through
122."99 One such limitation provides that the owner of a physical
copy "lawfully made under" the Copyright Act may publically
before the Supreme Court in Omega. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 93,
at *15.
96. Wiley, 654 F.3d at 219-20.
97. Id. at 220.
98. United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Ass'n Ltd., 484 U.S. 365,
371 (1988) ("A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often
clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme-because the same
terminology is used elsewhere in a context that makes its meaning clear, or
because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that
is compatible with the rest of the law").
99. 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (2006).
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display the work."co Following the Wiley interpretation of the
phrase "lawfully made under this title," an individual who had
lawful title to a work protected by copyright that was
manufactured abroad, and wished to display the work publically,
would be subject to copyright infringement liability if the owner of
the copyright did not consent to the display.
Elsewhere in the Copyright Act, applying the reasoning of the
Wiley court would frustrate the intention of Congress regarding a
provision concerning the public performance of video games.
Section 109(e), added in 1990, states, "the owner of a particular
copy of a [game] lawfully made under this title is entitled, without
the authority of the copyright owner of the game, to publically
perform or display that game in coin-operated equipment."'0 ' This
section was enacted specifically in response to Red BaronFranklin Park,Inc. v. Taito Corp., 883 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1989), a
decision that found that the first sale doctrine did not apply to the
public performance of Japanese-manufactured video games.'02 In
Red Baron, the court found that the first sale doctrine did not
apply, not because of foreign manufacture, but because the first
sale doctrine applied only to the distribution right and not the
public performance right.' In response, § 109(e) expands the first
sale doctrine to apply to the public performance right. However, if
the Wiley court's reasoning were followed, the first sale doctrine
would not apply to a situation similar to Red Baron, since the
games were manufactured abroad. Such a result would be in direct
opposition to the congressional intent to overrule Red Baron and
ensure that lawfully purchased copies of such games could be

100. Id. § 109(c).
101. Id. § 109(e) (emphasis added).
102. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT 25 n.54 (2001),
available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-104-report-vol1.pdf ("[Section 109(e)] was enacted as part of the Computer Software Rental
Amendments of 1990 in order to overturn the result in Red Baron-Franklin
Park,Inc. v. Taito Corp.... a case which held that a copyright owner could
prevent the purchaser of gray market circuit boards containing a copyrighted
videogame from performing the videogame in a video arcade.").
103. Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp., 883 F.2d 275, 280-81 (4th
Cir. 1989).
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publically performed without seeking consent of the copyright
holder.
When applying the Wiley court's reasoning to other portions of
Title 17, another apparent contradiction arises. The Audio Home
Recording Act ("AHRA") uses both the phrases "lawfully made
under this title" and "manufactured and distributed within the
United States." The AHRA requires the manufacturers of audio
recording devices to pay royalties to copyright owners. The statute
defines the copyright holders who should receive royalties as those
whose compositions or sound recordings have been "embodied in
a digital musical recording lawfully made under this title that has
been distributed."" Following the reasoning of the Wiley court,
this would mean that royalties would only be paid on digital
recordings that were manufactured domestically.
However,
elsewhere the AHRA directs royalty payments to "each digital
audio recording medium imported into and distributed in the
United States or manufactured and distributed within the United
Following the Second Circuit's reading of the phrase
States."'
"lawfully made under this title" would cause these two provisions
to be in conflict with one another, and would frustrate the
intentions of the drafters of AHRA.
Conversely, while interpreting "lawfully made under the title" to
mean "with the consent of the copyright owner" does not produce
these types of contradictory or nonsensical results, other
interpretations favorable to the defendants in Wiley are fraught
with problems. The Wiley court notes that plausible interpretations
of "lawfully made under this title" include not only "manufactured
in the United States," but also "any work made that is subject to
protection under this title," or "lawfully made under this title had
this title been applicable."l06 While the Second Circuit notes that
the latter two interpretations would produce a favorable result for
the defendant, they also have problems when the statute is viewed
as a whole." Specifically, the phrases "work protected under this
title" and "if this title had been applicable" both appear elsewhere
104.
105.
106.
107.

17 U.S.C. § 1006(a)(1)(A) (2006) (emphasis added).
Id. § 1004(b).
Wiley, 654 F.3d at 220.
Id. at 220 n.38.
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in the Copyright Act."o' Therefore, if Congress intended either of
those meanings to apply to "lawfully made under this title,"
Congress could have used that explicit language instead.
3. The Legislative History of the First Sale Doctrine is
Inconclusive
When the plain meaning of the statute is unclear and reading the
statute as a whole does not provide an answer, principles of
statutory construction permit consulting the statute's legislative
history for elucidation.'0 9 Unfortunately, the legislative history of
the Copyright Act is similarly murky and produces strong
conflicting arguments regarding the effect and limitations of both
the first sale doctrine and the importation right.
The current Act, enacted in 1976, began with studies
commissioned in 1955, and the first daft of the legislation
appeared in 1964."o This long history discloses a seemingly
unbroken support for the first sale doctrine since its inclusion in
the 1909 Act, but a mixed record on the significance given to
foreign manufacture and its relation to the first sale doctrine.
As discussed, the first sale doctrine was first applied to
copyright law in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Strauss in 1908, and was
subsequently added to the Copyright Act the following year. In

108. See 17 U.S.C. § 401(a) (2006) ("Whenever a work protected under this
title is published in the United States or elsewhere by authority of the copyright
owner, a notice of copyright as provided by this section may be placed on
publically distributed copies from which the work can be visually
perceived. . . .") (emphasis added); 17 U.S.C.

§ 602 (b) (2006) ("In a case

where the making of the copies an phonorecords would have constituted an
infringement of copyright if this title had been applicable,their importation is
prohibited.") (emphasis added).
109. Wirtz v. Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463, 468 (1968) ("[P]roper
construction [of a statute] frequently requires consideration of [the statute's]
wording against the background of its legislative history and in the light of the
general objectives Congress sought to achieve.").
110. See generally H.R. REP No. 94-1476, at 64 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5660-63 (describing the early history of the bills that
became the 1976 Act). The first draft of the 1976 Copyright Act can be found at
H.R. 11947, 88th Cong. (1964) and S. 3008, 88th Cong. (1964).
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Bobbs-Merrill, the Supreme Court plainly stated, "the copyright
statutes, while protecting the owner of the copyright, in his right to
multiply and sell his production, do not create the right to
impose .. . a limitation at which the book shall be sold at retail by
future purchasers, with whom there is no privity of contract.""'
The Court reached this conclusion without considering any
geographic limitations on this principle. Further, the Court noted
the "owner of the copyright [sold a quantity of books] at a price
satisfactory to it. It has exercised [its] right to vend."" 2 This is
particularly significant because, regardless of geographic
limitations, the plaintiff publisher in Wiley also sold copies in
quantity at a satisfactory price.
This principle of exhaustion of control without regard to
geographic limitations was codified the following year. The
Copyright Act of 1909 applies the first sale doctrine to "any copy
of a copyrighted work the possession of which has been lawfully
obtained""' This provision was added without any geographic
limitations on the place of manufacture and has not been amended
to include any such language since. It is thus clear that when the
first sale doctrine was codified, the primary concerns regarding
restrictions on the alienation of goods were considered broadly
without geographic limitations.
Further, where Congress deemed place of manufacture
important, it has been included in the text, such as the so-called
manufacturing clause of § 601(a). This clause, as codified in the
1909 Act, stated:
[t]hat in the case of a book, the copies so deposited
shall be accompanied by an affidavit ... duly made
by the person claiming copyright . . . setting forth
that the copies deposited have been printed from
type set within the limits of the United States or

111. Bobbs-Merrill,210 U.S. at 350.

112. Id. at 351.
113. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 41, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084.
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from plates made within the limits of the United
States from type set therein . . . .11
These geographic requirements were inserted into the Copyright
Act to protect the economic interests of "American typographers
and bookbinders against foreign competition."' 15 This prejudicial
stance against foreign manufacture "exemplifie[d] short-sighted
and parochial tendencies that [proved] destructive of the best
interests of both copyright creators and users.""' Thus realized,
Congress phased out the manufacturing clause beginning with the
1976 Act."' In doing so, Congress concluded that "there is no
justification on principle for a manufacturing requirement in the
copyright statute, and altogether there may have been some
economic justification for it at one time, that justification no longer
exists."' "

It is significant that the removal of the manufacturing clause
occurred at the same time Congress reaffirmed and codified the
first sale doctrine without geographic limitations. The phasing out
of the manufacturing clause indicates that Congress was
disregarding the place of manufacture as a determining factor on
whether goods protected by copyright could be distributed
domestically. At the same time, Congress reaffirmed the first sale
doctrine in § 109(a) without geographic limitations. The Supreme
Court has recognized that "few principles of statutory construction
are more compelling than the proposition that Congress does not
intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it had earlier
discarded."" 9 Therefore, it is difficult to infer that Congress
intended to read a geographic manufacturing restriction into § 109
114. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, §16, 35 Stat. 1075, 1079.
115. 2-7 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
7.22 (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed., 2012).
116. Id.
117. 17 U.S.C. § 601(a) (2006) (repealed 2010) (setting the expiration date
for the manufacturing clause as July 1, 1986).
118. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 166 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5782.
119. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 442-43 (1987) (quoting
Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 392-93
(1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
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at the same time it was phasing out other limitations tied to foreign
manufacture and reaffirming and restating the first sale doctrine
without explicit restrictions.'20
However, it has been argued that the legislative history § 602(a)
indicates that Congress intended § 602(a) to operate independent
of limitation imposed by the first sale doctrine of § 109(a).121
Initially, the Register of Copyright opposed liability for
unauthorized importation of lawfully acquired works.122 This was
followed by pressure from the publishing and music industry to
restrict importation of foreign manufactured copies.123 Following
these efforts, a provision was inserted into the 1964 draft of the
Copyright Act that prohibited the importation of non-piratical
copies acquired abroad and imported for distribution and gave U.S.
Customs the authority to seize such items at the border.124

120. Further complicating the matter, the legislative history states bluntly the

§ 602 "has nothing to do with the manufacturing requirements of § 601" as they
address two distinct problems. H.R. REP No. 94-1476, 169 (1976), reprintedin
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5785. It is unclear what effect this statement has on
interpreting the interaction between § 602(a)(1) and § 109(a).
121. See Mohr, supra note 8, at 566 (arguing that § 602's importation
restrictions, unchecked by the first sale doctrine, offer manufacturers a stronger
tool than trademark or contract law to control the importation of goods).
122. Copyright Law Revision, Part 1: Report of the Register of Copyrights
on the GeneralRevision of the U.S. Copyright Law Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 87th Cong. 126 (1965). The Register saw no reason "to impose the
territorial restriction in a private contract on a third person with no knowledge of
the agreement." Id.
123. In a hearing in response to the Register of Copyright's report,
publishing and music industry representatives noted that the proposed language
would not apply to copyrighted goods manufactured abroad, sold, and then
imported. Copyright Law Revision, Part 2: Discussion and Comments on
Report of Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright
Law Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 212 (1965).
Specifically, a music industry representative noted that a copyrighted item could
be imported without infringing the contract rights of the owner because a
foreign publisher could sell the item to a third party, who could then in turn
import the item. Id.
124. Preliminary Draft for U.S. Copyright Law (part 3) § 44 Alternative A
and § 44 Alternative B (July 20, 1964), reprintedin 6 KAMINSTEIN LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY PROJECT 420 (Alan Latman & James F. Lightstone eds., 1984). The
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Significantly, the following year, The Copyright Office had the
opportunity to directly address the question of the effect of the first
sale doctrine on the importation right. In a panel discussion before
the House Judiciary Committee, a representative from the
Copyright Office was presented a hypothetical question from a
participant representing authors regarding the sale and subsequent
importation of lawfully produced copies abroad."' Unfortunately,
the representative from the Copyright Office did not provide a
definitive answer regarding how the first sale doctrine would affect
this transaction either with regard to wholesale importers or
individual purchasers.' 2 6
Following further revisions, additional House Committee
Reports can be interpreted to understand that the right to limit
importation was not meant to be subject to the first sale doctrine.
For example, a House Judiciary Committee Report accompanying
the 1964 draft of the Act states that the importation of a
copyrighted work authorized for distribution aboard would be
two nearly identical drafts differed only in the powers of U.S. Customs to stop
infringing copies at the border.
125. Copyright Law Revision, Part4, FurtherDiscussions and Comments on
PreliminaryDraftfor Revised U.S. Copyright Law Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 88th Cong. 210-11 (1964). The exchange between the authors'
representative (Karp) and the Copyright Office representative (Goldman) was as
follows:
KARP: ... If a German jobber lawfully buys copies from a
German publisher, are we not running into the problem of
restricting his transfer of his lawfully obtained copies?
GOLDMAN: I would suppose that the whole answer depends
on whether the distribution would take place in the United
States would itself constitute an infringement of copyright.
When you apply this rule about the effect of the first sale of a
copy exhausting the right to control the further distribution of
that copy, your question would be whether this represents a
sale of the copy that does exhaust the right.
KARP: You are right, Abe.
GOLDMAN: This could vary from one situation to another, I
guess. I should guess, for example, that if a book publisher
transports copies to a wholesaler, this is not yet the kind of
transaction that exhausts the right to control disposition.
Id.
126. Id.
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infringement. 127 Further, exceptions were made for "educational,
personal, and religious use," but without mentioning the first sale
doctrine, suggesting that these were the only exceptions to the
right to limit importation.128 Finally, because there were no
substantial changes between the 1967 draft and the final version
enacted in 1976, it can be inferred that the breadth of § 602(a) was
firmly established, and without significant opposition.129
Ultimately, there is no specific language in the legislative
history that addresses directly the proper interaction between §
602(a) and § 109(a). Although the first sale doctrine is firmly
embedded in the statute, the scope of its reach is unclear from
Congressional reports. At times, Congress certainly favored
restrictions on items manufactured abroad and treated such items
differently, however it also has scaled back and questioned utility
of these efforts. This lack of clarity further reinforces the need for
either the Supreme Court or the legislature to speak definitively to
the issue.
4. Should the PrinciplesofExtraterritorialityDefine the Meaning
of§ 109(a)?
In finding the phrase "lawfully made under this title" to apply
only to domestically manufactured copies authorized by the
copyright holder, the Ninth Circuit in Omega relied on the
principles of extraterritoriality. As stated by the Ninth Circuit,

127. Copyright Law Revision, Part 6, Supplementary Report of the Register
of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law Before the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary,89th Cong. 149-50 (1965). The report states: "[i]n the
second situation covered by § 602, the copies ... were lawfully made but their
distribution in the United States would violate the exclusive rights of the U.S.
copyright owner. This would occur, for example, where the copyright owner
had authorized the making of copies in a foreign country for distribution only in
that country." Id. Note however, that this concerns violating a contractual
distribution requirement, but does not address the issue if the copies were
lawfully sold abroad and then imported. This is essentially the same
hypothetical posed by the Supreme Court in Quality King. See supra note 57
and accompanying text.
128. H.R. REP. No. 89-2237, at 168-69 (1966).
129. Mohr, supra note 8 at 604-05.
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"[t]he common understanding of the presumption against
extraterritoriality is that a U.S. statute 'appl[ies] only to conduct
occurring within, or having effect within, the territory of the
United States, unless the contrary is clearly indicated by the
statute."'o While the Omega court relied on this principle in
arguing for a limited application of the first sale doctrine, there is
evidence that at least some portions of the Copyright Act do apply
to actions occurring outside the United States.
Considering the principles of extraterritoriality, the Ninth Circuit
determined that "lawfully made under this title" could not refer to
copies manufactured outside the United States because it would
extend the reach of the Copyright Act "in the absence of a clear
expression of congressional intent in favor of extraterritoriality.""'
In citing an earlier decision on the scope of the Copyright Act, the
Ninth Circuit boldly proclaimed, "[t]here is no clear expression of
congressional intent in either the 1976 Act or other relevant
enactments to alter the preexisting extraterritoriality doctrine."' 32
The government made a similar argument in support of Wiley in
its amicus brief filed with the Supreme Court. The government's
brief plainly states that "[b]ecause the Copyright Act does not
apply outside the United States, foreign-made copies are not 'made

under' Title 17.133
However, this stance by the Ninth Circuit and the government
oversimplifies and incorrectly states the scope of the Copyright
Act. Although it also found that "lawfully made under this title" is
limited to copies manufactured domestically, the Second Circuit in
Wiley recognized that "certain provisions in Title 17 explicitly take
account of activity occurring abroad."' 34 Specifically, the Wiley
court noted that § 104(b)(2) provides that "the works specified by

130. Omega, 541 F.3d at 987-88 (quoting
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF

§ 38 (1965)).

131. Id. at 988.
132. Id. (quoting Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Conmnc'ns Co., 24 F.3d
1088, 1096, (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc)).
133. Brief for the United States at 6, Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
654 F.3d 210 (2011) (No. 11-697); See also id at 12 ("It is well established,
however, that the Copyright Act does not apply outside the United States.").
134. Wiley, 654 F.3d at 219.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol23/iss1/5

30

Paul: Black and White: A Path Toward Clarity for Copyright Law and Gray

2012]

BLACK AND WHITE

185

sections 102 and 103, when published, are subject to protection
under this title if the work is first published in the United States or
in a foreign nation that, on the date of first publication, is a treaty
party."' 35
Here, the Wiley court recognized that because §
104(b)(2) provides copyright protection for works published
abroad, "lawfully made under this title" could reasonably be
interpreted to mean "any work that is subject to protection under
this title."'
Commentator William Patry, who concludes that § 109(a)
should not apply to copies made abroad explains, "[s]ince title 17
does not [generally] apply extraterritorially 'lawfully made under
this title . . . ."' does not apply to copies made overseas, either with

or without the copyright owner's permission.' However, if some
parts of the Act are clearly extraterritorial and others are not, the
meaning and scope of § 109(a) seems unclear at best and
extraterritoriality is an improper principle to define its bounds. If
anything, introducing the principle into the analysis only further
obscures the proper application of the first sale doctrine.
5. Will Subjecting § 602(a)(1) to the Limitations of the FirstSale
Doctrine Strip All Meaning From the Section?
There are competing views on whether applying the first sale
doctrine of § 109(a) will vitiate the meaning of § 602(a). Courts
and commentators have argued that interpreting §109(a) to apply
to § 602(a) would strip all the meaning from the latter provision."'
Yet, the two sections can be read in harmony with § 602(a)
retaining meaningful value even after subjecting it to the
limitations found in §109(a). While reading § 109(a) to apply to §
602(a) certainly gives the latter section less force, the section still
has utility and would be in line with the clear original intent of the
first sale doctrine.
In Wiley, the Second Circuit began with the premise that §
602(a) "is obviously intended to allow copyright holders some
135. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 104(2)(b) (2006) (emphasis in original)).
136. Id. at 219-20.
137. WILLIAM F. PATRY, 4 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 13:22 (2012).
138. See generally Hintz, supra note 5.
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flexibility to divide or treat differently the international or
domestic markets for the particular copyrighted work."" 9 Under
the court's analysis, the importation right "would have no force in
the vast majority of cases if the first sale doctrine was interpreted
to apply to every copy that was manufactured abroad that was
either made 'subject to protection under Title 17,' or 'consistent
with the requirements of Title 17 had Title 17 been applicable."'"40
Specifically, the court notes that this reading of § 602(a) would
only give copyright holders the ability to control importation of
their works when either "(i) the individual importing the copy of
the work does not legally 'own' the copy in question, or (ii) the
work in question was produced in a country where the United
States copyright is not protected." 4 '
To support its broader reading of § 602(a), the Wiley court relied
on what the Supreme Court "appear[s] to have had in mind when
deciding Quality King."l4 2 The Wiley court turning to a passage in
dicta in Quality King that stated § 602(a) "applies to a category of
copies that are neither piratical nor 'lawfully made under this title.'
That category encompasses copies that were 'lawfully made' not
under the United States Copyright Act, but instead under the laws
of some other country."'4 3 The Wiley court used that passage to
draw the conclusion that "copies 'lawfully made' under the laws of
a foreign country-though perhaps not produced in violation of
any United States laws-are not necessarily 'lawfully made' under
the meaning § 109(a) . . . ."""' This argument was repeated by the

government before the Supreme Court in Wiley, stating "the Court

139. Wiley, 644 F.3d at 221.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 221 n.40.
142. Id. at 221.
143. Id. (quoting Quality King, 523 U.S. at 147).
144. Id. The Wiley court also noted that elsewhere in Quality King, the
Supreme court suggested that § 602(a) is broader than § 109 "because it
encompasses copies that are not subject to the first sale doctrine-e.g. copies
that are lawfully made under the laws of another country." Id. at 221 n.42 (citing
Quality King, 523 U.S. at 148).
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in Quality King drew a sharp distinction between copies 'made
under' Title 17 and copies "made under' foreign law."" 4 5
However, this line of reasoning is flawed because the statements
were made in dicta in a case that did not directly address copies
manufactured abroad. In Quality King, the Court considered only
copies manufactured domestically, exported, and re-imported. In
her concurrence, Justice Ginsburg delineated the two issues,
"recognizing that we do not today resolve cases in which the
allegedly infringing imports were manufactured abroad."' 46
The weight given to dicta by the Wiley court should be qualified
by the Supreme Court's later action in Costco Wholesale Corp. v.
Omega. In Omega, the Supreme Court dealt directly with the issue
of whether § 109(a) qualified the importation right in § 602(a).
There, rather than affirm its earlier statements in Quality King, the
Court was divided 4-4. An equally divided court, ruling on an
issue briefed and argued squarely before it, surely diminishes the
impact of earlier dicta in a case pertaining to a tangential issue.147
Even if the first sale doctrine applies to the right to limit
importation under § 602(a), that section still retains utility for
copyright holders. First, the section would provide an extra
enforcement tool against publishers or manufactures where
international markets are divided by contract. For example,
suppose a copyright holder such as Wiley had exclusive
publication and distribution agreements with publishers in Asia
and the United States. If the Asian publisher begins exporting and
selling its copies to the United States, it would clearly be a
violation of the exclusive contract. However, even if the first sale
doctrine applies to § 602(a), it would also be an act of copyright
infringement, enforceable through all the remedies available under

145. Brief for the United States at 13-14, Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons,
Inc., 644 F.3d 210 (2011) (No. 11-697).
146. QualityKing, 534 U.S. at 1135 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
147. See 2-8 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 8.12[B](6)[d] (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2012) (noting that with
as many votes on the Supreme Court to accept the reasoning of Omega as there
were to reject it, the line of reasoning that limits the first sale doctrine to apply
only to copies manufactured within the United States "must therefore be
regarded as wobbly").
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the Act.148 These remedies include injunctive relief, the infringer's
profits, statutory damages, impoundment, and costs and attorneys
fees.149 Here, § 602(a) is hardly toothless in supporting the rights
of copyright holders.
Additionally, § 602(a), as limited by the first sale doctrine, also
provides a powerful enforcement tool against importers of
counterfeit goods manufactured abroad. Counterfeit goods are by
definition not made with the consent of the copyright holder.
Furthermore, importers such as shipping companies or e-retailers
may not actually own the goods to be transferred. In this instance,
§ 602(a) gives copyright owners the ability to seek an infringement
action against these players in the trade of counterfeit goods and
Also, this
subject them to the remedies discussed above.
encourages these intermediaries to be diligent in policing the
goods of their trade, further suppressing the counterfeit market.
In concluding its analysis on the interaction between § 109(a)
and the § 602(a), the Second Circuit "freely acknowledge[s] that
this is a particularly difficult question of statutory construction . . .
but [that its] holding is supported by the structure of Title 17 as
well as the Supreme Court's opinion in Quality King."' As

148. In fact, this is the very hypothetical scenario that the Supreme Court
incorrectly analyzes in Quality King:
[i]f the author of [a] work gave the exclusive United States
distribution rights-enforceable under the Act-to the
publisher of the U. S. edition and the exclusive British
distribution rights to the publisher of the British edition ...
presumably only those made by the publisher of the U.S.
edition would be 'lawfully made under this title' within the
meaning of § 109(a). The first sale doctrine would not
provide the publisher of the British edition who decided to sell
in the American market with a defense to an action under §
602(a) (or, for that matter, to an action under § 106(3), if there
was a distribution of the copies).
Quality King, 523 U.S. at 148.
In this scenario, the first sale doctrine would not relieve the British publisher
of liability because there has been no sale. Thus, the British publisher in this
hypothetical would be subject to an infringement action as well as breach of
contract, regardless of the scope of § 109(a).
149. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502-505 (2006).
150. Wiley, 654 F.3d at 222.
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shown, the structure and language of Title 17, including its
legislative history, provide no clear guidance on the interaction
between § 109(a) and § 602(a). Further, the Second Circuit has
misread the Supreme Court. For these reasons, either the Supreme
Court or Congress must act definitively to clarify the meaning of
the statute.
6. Conclusion of Statutory Analysis.
When analyzing the plain meaning of the statute, looking at the
statute as a whole, and considering the legislative history of the
statute, there are clear and defensible reasons for interpreting the
phrase "lawfully made under the title" to apply to copies of goods
regardless of place of manufacture. However, it is also clear by
the decision of the Wiley court that there are valid alternative
meanings based on the above analyses. This confusion only
bolsters the need to have Supreme Court review for the Wiley case,
or for a legislative solution.
B. Policy Considerations
Concluding its opinion in Wiley, the Second Circuit recognized
the potential policy implications of its ruling, stating "[i]f we have
misunderstood Congressional purpose in enacting the first sale
doctrine, or if our decision leads to policy consequences that were
not foreseen by Congress or which Congress finds unpalatable,
Relying
Congress is of course able to correct our judgment."'
entirely on textual analysis, the Second Circuit did not consider the
policy ramifications of its decision. This section will demonstrate
how, in light of the ambiguous meaning of the statute, the policy
considerations are paramount and weigh heavily in favor of
interpreting the first sale doctrine of § 109(a) to apply to the
importation right in § 602(a).
First, because the first sale doctrine furthers the Copyright Act's
policy of dissemination, any limitation of its application runs
counter to the purpose of the Act. Second, any geographic

151. Id.
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limitations of the first sale doctrine are contrary to long established
policies against restraints on trade. Finally, limiting the first sale
doctrine's application to domestically manufactured copies could
have detrimental effects on the economy, including the chilling of
secondary markets, higher costs to consumers and the loss of
American jobs.
1. The Reasoning of Omega and Wiley is Contrary to the Purposes
of the CopyrightAct.
The Constitution empowers Congress "To promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."52 To meet that directive, the Supreme
Court has stated that Congress may "determine the intellectual
regimes that, overall, in that body's judgment, will serve the ends
of the Clause."' It has been debated whether this directive means
that Congress should create schemes merely to encourage the
creation of new work or whether encouraging the distribution of
works also furthers this purpose.'54
The Supreme Court recently emphasized the dissemination
rationale behind the Copyright Act, observing that "the creation of
at least one new work, however, is not the sole way Congress may
promote knowledge and learning" and "[e]vidence from the
founding suggests that inducing dissemination-as opposed to
creation-was viewed as an appropriate means to promote
science."'

This policy was embodied in its most basic form in the

pre-1976 requirement that copies of works be filed with the
Library of Congress to receive protection.'"' This policy continues
in the requirement that copies must be submitted with

152.
153.
154.
(2012).
155.
156.

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003).
See generally Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222; Golan v. Holder, 132 S.Ct. 873
Golan, 132 S.Ct. at 854-55.
Id. at 855.
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These requirements encourage dissemination by
registration.'
ensuring that in exchange for protection under the Copyright Act,
the works must be publically available. Further, while authors
may create new works, it is through distribution under the
exclusive rights granted in the Act that rights holders may profit
from their creations.
In the controversy surrounding the scope of the first sale
doctrine, interpreting the doctrine to be applicable to copies made
overseas with the consent of the copyright holder furthers the
dissemination policy of the Copyright Act. The first sale doctrine
is a driving force behind the dissemination of copyrighted works.
The first sale doctrine allows libraries to provide access to millions
of volumes of copyrighted works, encourages individuals to buy
and sell copies of works after they have exhausted their useful life
in the hands of the original owner, and encourages friends,
families, and charitable donors to share knowledge embodied in
lawfully obtained copies of copyrighted works. This makes the
existence of the first sale doctrine central to the core purpose of the
Copyright Act, and any limitations placed on the first sale doctrine
frustrate the core purpose of the Act.
If the phrase "lawfully made under this title" is read to apply
only to domestically-manufactured copies, as held by the Second
Circuit in Wiley, copyright holders would be able to move
manufacturing abroad to control the importation and distribution
of their works regardless of how many times the copy changes
hands. If this reading of the phrase is upheld, it could encourage
copyright holders to move the manufacture of copies of their work
overseas and gain this perpetual control. With such control, the
dissemination of works would certainly be impeded. For instance,
libraries and schools could not lend and distribute educational
material protected by copyright that was lawfully purchased
without first obtaining the permission of the copyright holder. To
do otherwise would subject them to potential liability for copyright
infringement. Further, the secondary sale of works would also
need approval from the copyright holder, likely chilling the

157. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2006). However, under current law, registration is
only permissive and not mandatory. Id.
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reselling of copies of copyrighted material from garage sales to
neighborhood bookstores to large resellers in the secondary
marketplace such as eBay. The net effect of this requirement
would be a decline on the distribution of creative works. These
extreme results run counter to the core dissemination purpose of
the Copyright Act.
To be sure, a broad reading of the first sale doctrine will lessen
the rights that copyright holders enjoy under the reasoning of
Omega and Wiley. However, the constitutional directive behind
the Copyright Act is not to enrich and reward creative individuals
with broad property rights; rather, it is "to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts." This is a directive to craft legislation
that benefits the whole of society, not just creators. Reading the
phrase "lawfully made under this title" to apply to all copies made
with the permission of the copyright holder, without regard to
geographic location, may not provide copyright holders with the
desired control over their works, but it will satisfy the
constitutional directive to enrich society as a whole and ensure
copyright holders receive a monetary reward for the first sale of
each authorized copy of their work.
2. There is a Long-Held GeneralPolicy Against Restraints on the
Transfer of Goods.
The first sale doctrine is rooted in long-held common law rules
This policy
regarding restraints on the alienation of property.'
was incorporated into copyright law under Bobbs-Merrill, and has
consistently been part of federal copyright law since 1909. These
roots were based on general principles regarding trade and the free
flow of goods, and were not proscribed by any geographic
limitations. The reasoning of the Omega and Wiley courts runs
counter to this established policy.
This recent about-face has coincided with a push by media
companies and consumer goods manufacturers to control the
158. Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The
First Sale Doctrine in Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 487, 494
(2011); see generally JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION
OF PROPERTY (2d ed 1895).
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importation of secondary market goods. Such companies have
"waged a full-scale battle in legislative, executive, and
administrative fora" for regulations to grant them control over such
imports.15 9 Failing elsewhere, "manufacturers are now realizing
that copyright may furnish a supplemental vehicle for
protection."'
Copyright owners that have profited from the first
legal sales or their work are thus trying to take control over the
secondary marketplace in opposition to the policy against these
types of restraints on trade.
In order to satisfy the long held policy of free exchange of
goods, the first sale doctrine must apply to all copies of
copyrighted works created with the consent of the copyright
holder. To interpret the interplay between § 109(a) and § 602(a)
otherwise would run contrary to centuries-old policy. It would
allow copyright holders to use the law like a "weapon against gray
market goods,"'"' maximizing the control of goods and prices to
the detriment of consumers.
It bears repeating that the
constitutional directive behind the Copyright Act is to benefit
society through promoting "the progress of Science and Useful
Arts," not the private interests of rights-holders.
3. Specified Economic Effects.
In addition to the inherent aims of the Copyright Act and the
broader economic policy against restraints on the alienation of
goods, the limitation of the first sale doctrine to only copies
manufactured within the United States could have specific
negative economic effects. These interrelated effects could be the
chilling of secondary markets, higher costs for consumers, the
movement of manufacturing abroad, and the loss of American
jobs.
The United States government has even acknowledged these
negative policy concerns as a result of a limited first sale doctrine.
159. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 295-96 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
160. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 2-8 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
8.11(B)(4) (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed. 2009).
161. Hintz, supra, note 5 at 1191.
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In its brief supporting the copyright holders in Omega before the
Supreme Court, the government noted that "the court of appeals'
reasoning could result in adverse policy consequences, particularly
if carried to its logical extreme."62 The government conceded,
"[t]he potential implications of excluding foreign-made copies of a
copyrighted work from § 109(a)'s coverage are indeed
The government's brief noted specifically that
troubling.""
"higher unemployment," "encouraging companies to move
manufacturing overseas," and the potential hesitation among
secondary retailers "to sell a variety of products for fear that the
sale could be deemed infringing" were concerns."
a. Following the Reasoning of the Omega and Wiley Courts
May Stifle Secondary Markets.
If the Supreme Court affirms the reasoning of Wiley and Omega,
the secondary market sector of the economy may suffer greatly.
Granting copyright holders not just a monopoly of the first sale of
the goods, but control over each subsequent transfer, could impose
enormous costs, chilling the secondary market.165
Interpreting the fist sale doctrine to apply only to goods
manufactured in the United States would create a tremendous
burden on those in the secondary market that would be effectively

162. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Costco, 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010) (No. 08-1423), 2010 WL 979062 at *18.
163. Id.
164. Id. at *17-18. Even though the government recognized the potential
negative policy ramifications, it supported a limited view of the first sale
doctrine because it considered the effects a "direct ... consequence of
Congress's decision in 1976 to expand § 602's ban on unauthorized importation
beyond piratical copies [which] segment[ed] domestic and foreign markets." Id.
at * 18. However, it is unclear how the logical conclusion of Congress allowing
further domestic and foreign market segmentation would require a geographic
limitation to be read into the first sale doctrine for the first time.
165. See Sony Discos Inc. v. E.J.C. Family P'ship, No. H-02-3729, 2010 WL
1270342, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2010) ("The essential trade in the Copyright
Act is monopoly and policing: the grant of exclusivity comes with the duty to
protect it. The Act does not grant the holder the windfall of both monopoly and
reimbursement for its maintenance.").
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impossible to comply with. Such an interpretation would require
those in the secondary market to identify each good covered by
copyright and ascertain its legal status, based on where it was
manufactured, perhaps where it had previously been sold, and
whether the copyright owner consented to its distribution. Such
activities would have to be undertaken by all secondary merchants
from neighborhood used book and record shops to large
international resellers, such as eBay. To do otherwise, any
secondary retailer would risk an action for copyright infringement.
The economic effect of this burden could be devastating to the
secondary marketplace. The costs associated with investigating
the legal status of each item of merchandise will surely drive up
business costs, resulting in higher costs for consumers, less profits,
potential job losses, or even forced exits from the marketplace.
The effect on the growing international secondary market could
also potentially be damaging. Over the last three years, the value
of secondhand goods market has increased from $5,205,218,000 in
2009 to $6,401,858,000 in 2010 and $7,082,062,000 in 2011.166
Limiting the scope of the first sale doctrine could thus impede a
multi-billion dollar and growing sector of the economy.
b. Following the Reasoning in Wiley Could Negatively Effect
Consumers
Interpreting the phrase "lawfully made under this title" to apply
only to goods made in the United States with the copyright
holder's permission could have a potential negative impact on
consumers. If copyright holders are given perpetual control over
the distribution of copies made overseas, they could effectively
end the secondary market for their previously sold copies, only
authorizing sales at established prices. Furthermore, the increased
costs incurred by secondary sellers to investigate the copyright
status of their goods could drive up the costs to consumers.

166. Value of Exports, General Imports, and Imports for Consumption by
(NAICS - 920) Used or Second-hand Merchandise, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
available at http://censtats.census.gov/. These statistics represent the customs
value basis for general imports.
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In its amicus brief in support of Wiley, the government
dismissed concerns about these potential harms to consumers by
noting that the perpetual control possible under the Second
Circuit's opinion in Wiley has not yet occurred.'6 ' Furthermore, it
suggested that the burden should be on consumers to police
overzealous copyright holders if they attempt to fully exercise the
breadth of the Second Circuit's opinion.16
C. A Narrow View of the FirstSale Doctrine Could Encourage
U.S. Manufacturing to Move Overseas, Resulting in a Loss of
American Jobs
If the holding in Wiley is followed and upheld, copyright holders
may also adversely affect the United States economy by driving
the manufacture of more goods abroad. If copyright holders gain
perpetual control over the transfer of goods manufactured abroad,
there will be less incentive to manufacture goods that incorporate
copyrightable matter domestically. Following the Wiley court's
reasoning could thus cause American workers to lose their jobs
and their ability to contribute to the economy. The position of the
President is that the key to improving the economy is to create and
encourage "an economy built on American manufacturing."l69
Following the reasoning of the Wiley court would undermine this
principle, potentially having a negative impact on the economy.
These results, either individually or together, could lead to the loss
of American jobs. With the United States economy in a slow and
precarious recovery, a policy that could potentially reduce the
American workforce could have far-reaching negative economic
consequences.
167. Brief for the United States at 26, Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
No. 11-697 (2012) ("Petitioner identifies no instance in which a copyright
owner has actually sought to exercise such control").
168. Id. ("The application of Section 602(a)(1) to [consumer goods] raises
distinct policy concerns that are best addressed under legal theories, such as the
doctrine of copyright misuse, that are specifically targeted at that alleged
abuse.").
169. THE WHITE HOUSE BLUEPRINT FOR AN AMERICA BUILT TO LAST 2,
availableat http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/blueprint
foranamerica built tolast.pdf. (last visited Nov. 11, 2012).
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IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

In order to resolve the current instability and unpredictability
regarding the situation of gray market goods, either the Supreme
Court should find in favor of the petitioners in Wiley or Congress
should take legislative action. Due to the immediacy of the
problem and the opportunity for fast resolution, a ruling in favor of
the petitioners in Wiley is preferred. If the Supreme Court rules in
favor of the respondents, Congress should Act quickly in order to
resolve or avoid the potential negative outcomes.
A. Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has granted a writ of certiorari in Wiley and
oral arguments were heard on October 29, 2012. The question
presented by the petitioners is:
[c]an a foreign-made product never be resold within
the United Stated without the copyright owner's
permission, as the Second Circuit held in this case?
Can such a foreign-made product sometimes be
resold within the United States without permission,
but only after the owner approves an earlier sale in
this country, as the Ninth Circuit held in Costco? Or
can such a product always be resold without
permission within the United States, so long as the
copyright owner authorized the first sale abroad, as
the Third Circuit has indicated?..o
By holding that foreign-made products under copyright
protection are "lawfully made under this title" and that they can
always be resold without permission of the copyright holder, the
Supreme Court can clarify inherently conflicting sections of the
copyright act, bring certainty to the secondary marketplace, and
further the larger aims of the Copyright Act.

170. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Wiley, 132 S. Ct. 1905 (No. 11-697).
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The policy arguments enumerated in Section III may not be
persuasive to the court. A unanimous court in Quality King
recognized the potential far-reaching policy implications
surrounding the controversy of gray market goods. However, the
Court stated, "whether or not we think it would be wise policy to
provide statutory protection for such price discrimination is not a
matter that is relevant to our duty to interpret the text of the
Copyright Act.""'
B. Congress
If the Supreme Court does not find in favor of the petitioners in
Wiley, Congress should amend the Copyright Act to plainly state
that the first sale doctrine applies to all copies made with the
consent of the copyright holder - without regard to place of
manufacture. In doing so, Congress can resolve these judicial
disputes, reaffirm the principles behind the first sale doctrine and
unequivocally support the broader aims of the Copyright Act.'72
Congress may make this change in a number of ways, some
likely more clear and effective than others. First, Congress may
add a simple phrase to the beginning of § 602(a): "Subject to §
109(a)." This prefix would clearly indicate that the importation
right is subject to the first sale doctrine and would be in line with
the Supreme Court's reasoning in Quality King. However, it
would still leave unresolved the meaning of the phrase "lawfully
made under this title," and while courts could interpret § 602(a) to
be subject to § 109(a), they may still read a geographic restriction
into the phrase.
A preferred, solution would be to add the phrase "lawfully made
under this title" to the definitions found in 17 U.S.C. § 101. In
doing so, it should define "lawfully made under this title to mean
"any work that is subject to protection under this title." This
change would confirm that any copy of a copyrighted work, (i)
171. Quality King, 523 U.S. at 153.
172. Such action would not be without precedent, as Congress amended §
109(e) in the wake of the Red Baron decision to reinforce its intent that some
foreign-manufactured works are subject to the first sale doctrine. See supra,
Part IV.A.
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made with the authorization of the copyright holder, (ii) regardless
of location, and (iii) when the other requirements of the statute are
met, would be subject to the first sale doctrine. Additionally, this
would not change the meaning of other sections in Title 17 that use
the phrase "lawfully made under this title."
In order to strongly support the commitment to a broad reading
of the first sale doctrine, it is recommend that, in the absence of
Supreme Court finding in favor of the petitioners in Wiley,
Congress enact legislation to amend the Copyright Act to include
both of the proposed changes above. Such a change would clearly
subject the importation right to the limits of the first sale doctrine
and reaffirm the doctrine's broad scope.
V. CONCLUSION

United States companies attempting to thwart importation of
goods intended to be sold in foreign markets have turned to
copyright law to stop these imports. There is currently a circuit
split among the Third, Ninth, and Second Circuits regarding the
ability of United States copyright holders to block the importation
of goods legally made and sold abroad. While the text and
legislative history of the Copyright Act is unclear regarding this
question, the principles behind the Copyright Act and broader
economic policies favor the importation right to be limited by the
first sale doctrine. This issue should thus either be resolved by the
Supreme Court in Wiley or remedied by Congress by an amending
the Copyright Act.
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